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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
r''c

'.iTATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff /Respondent

JrJSEPH LOVATO,

Case No. 18993

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated
Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 405, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

•

Appellant's motion for a directed verdict to the jury ordering
them to bring back a verdict of not guilty was denied.
found the appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault.
rn

The jury
Pursuant

the verdict, appellant was sentence to a term of five years

'.n life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of Aggravated
cDv,u'll Assault or, in the alternative, that his case be remanded
Hre

District Court for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 17, 1982, between 1·30 a.m.

and 2 0(1 a.m,

se·1 e 1 ,

people dropped by the apartment where Carme1 i to Romero ("Complai,
ant") was staying (T. 5, 7, 9).

Complainant knew before hand that

one of the men, John Hall, was coming over, but did not know
the others would stop by (T. 7).

Joseph Lovato ("Appellant")

was among the people at the apartment (T.8).
The group listened to music, used the phone and talked for a
couple hours before everyone except complainant left (T.6,9).
Appellant could not get a ride home so he returned to the
apartment and asked complainant if he could use her phone to
call for a ride (T. 10-11).
Complainant let appellant in and he made two calls from the
phone located in the bedroom in an attempt to get a ride (T.11,
205,235).

Appellant spoke with his aunt at about 3:25 a.m. and,

after speaking with her, expected a cab to arrive at the apartment
(T. 207,235).
While complainant and appellant agree that sexual intercourse
took place between them that night, their testimony about how
that came about differs.
According to appellant, after he made his calls, compla'nant
told him she was pregnant and that her boyfriend left her
of it and she did not know what she was going to do (T.208).
Complainant then went into the bathroom and returned wearing onl··
a white jersey and black panties and invited appellant into the
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(,edroom (T.

209).

They had sexual intercourse, by mutual consent,

,,,lLh complainant on top and appellant underneath,

throughout (T.209).
(T. 64-65).

on his back

They also engaged in cunnilingus and fellatio

Appellant never took off his clothes because he

had seen a suitcase and work boots in the apartment, and expected
a man to return for them (T.209).
The pocket knife appellant had used earlier at the apartment
to clean his nails was in his pocket (T. 203,210).
single small, dull blade (T. 203,204).
pocket during intercourse (T. 56,210).

It had a

It fell out of appellant's
According to both

complainant and appellant, complainant found the knife in the bed
and gave it to appellant (T. 56,210).

The knife was lost by the

prosecution and not placed into evidence at trial (T.190-192).
Complainant testified at trial that appellant grabbed her
by the bones

of the throat while she stood with him at the

front door (T. 14,50,51).

The front door was open (T. 51).

According to complainant (at trial) appellant had one hand on
her throat and held the knife to her temple with the other hand,
then dragged her into the bedroom (T. 51-54).

There was no

testimony as to how or whether the front door was ever closed
although complainant's testimony indicates that it was not open
later when Nils Swenson came over (T.

26-27,78-79).

On the night of the incident, complainant told the officer
3

different version--that she initially did not want to let

aopellant into the apartment and that she was carried into the
Ledroom and thrown onto the bed before a knife was drawn (T. 145-146).
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Complainant also testified at tri:-d t!1a1_ a!'pcll.int threw
her against the bed,

floor and 1val ls

(T

Li\).

She haJ n<>t

previously mentioned being thrown against the walls
She had no

bruises on her back, arms or throat

(T.

(T. 62,95-100).

Neither her clothing nor underpants were torn (T. 62).
did not kick, scratch, bite or yell

l/4fi)

She

(T. 56).

The night of the incident, complainant told both appellant
and Officer Davis that she was pregnant (T.
However, at trial

70,146-147,208).

she testified, or at least implied by her

testimony, that she had not been pregnant at the time (T.
Complainant

70,84).

and appellant turned on the television and

talked after the intercourse.

Complainant testified that she did

not know where the knife was during this time, and that she did
not pay much attention to where it was

(T.69-70).

At some point during their time alone together, appellant
and complainant discussed complainant's cousin, Julia, and
another woman, Charlena, and appellant's relationship with them
(T. 66-67).

Complainant asked appellant "what Charlena was to

him" and believedCharlena was his girlfriend (T. 66-67).
Appellant thought this conversation took place before they had
intercourse; complainant testified that she brought the subject
up after they had intercourse (T. 52,66-67).
Complainant was angry with Julia and Charlena on the ni6hr
of the incident.

She believed Charelena had cut the waterbed

(T. 39-40, 67-68).
-4-

At about 6:00 a.m., complainant told appellant that her
"L1ther" was coming to get the suitcase and boots, and that

she needed to call him (T.

21-22,68-69).

Appellant helped

oer find the phone number in the phone book (T. 68-69).
Complainant actually telephoned Nils Swenson, the man who paid
rent for the apartment, owned the waterbed, and allowed
complainant to stay at the apartment rent free (T. 21-22,60-69).
Appellant was awake when complainant dialed and knew that
complainant's "father" might be coming to the apartment (T.70-71).
Appellant lay on the bed fully clothed and fell asleep in the
midst of complainant's conversation with Nils Swenson (T.

71).

About half an hour after complainant phoned him, Nils
Swenson arrived at the apartment (T. 26).

Throughout that

period, appellant lay sleeping on the bed (T.

73,76).

Complain-

ant was in the kitchen and living room, and was as near the front
door as the bedroom while appellant slept.

Had appellant been

awake, he would not have been able to see the front door without
leaning to the side of the bed (T.

72,86-87).

There were apartments on both sides of the apartment, in
addition to a store and laundry (T. 121-122).

Numerous over-

crowdedapartments were across the street (T. 122-123).

Although

appellant was asleep for over half an hour, complainant did not
leave the apartment nor call for help (T.

74-78).

When Nils Swenson finally arrived, complainant held a note
up to the front window telling him to call the police (T. 27,112).
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Swenson stepped closer to the door to read

112).

note (T.

Complainant did not leave the apartment when Swenson arr i V<"d
she chose to remain with appellant (T.

78-7g).

Swenson went to the corner and called the police (T

113).

The police arrived and parked out of view (T. 113, 13 3-134) .
Several minutes later, complainant exited the apartment (T. 134)
Officer Davis was impressed by how controlled she was

(T. 135).

Appellant was still asleep, stomach down, when the officers
entered the bedroom and cuffed him from the rear (T. 140).
Complainant was examined following the incident.

While no

sperm was found in her vagina, sperm was found in the crotch
of her underwear (T. 93,158).
Following the incident, a rape crisis volunteer filled out
an incident report form (T. 173).

The form indicated that

complainant's last sexual intercourse prior to the incident
occurred on January 25, 1981 (T. 242).

Defense counsel was not

permitted to ask that question nor to attempt to establish that
complainant had intercourse less than forty eight hours prior
to the incident even though complainant had already made it clear
to the jury that she was not chaste (see T. 19,238-246).
Following the examination, complainant was given medication
to abort pregnancy and eliminate venereal disease (T.

79,102).

Appellant was tried and convicted of aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF COMPLAINANT'S
LAST SEXUAL INTERCOURSE PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT.
A.

THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO
SHOW COMPLAINANT CONSENTED TO THE ACT.

It has long been the rule in Utah that where a defendant in
a rape case claims that no intercourse occurred, evidence of a
complainant's prior sexual activity or chastity is not admissible.
See

State v. Scott, 188 P. 860 (Utah 1920); State v. Sims, 517

P.2d 466 (Utah 1975); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980).
However, where the critical issue is consent, courts have admitted
such evidence.

See State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466,469;

State v. Scott, supra at 864.

The probative value of such evi-

dence was set forth in State v. Scott, supra at 864:
Where the defendant admits the sexual act,
but contends that the proseuctrix consented
thereto, and where, as here, she is of lawful age, such evidence is relevant and
material upon the question of consent.
While it is true that even a prostitute
may refuse consent to the sexual act, yet,
in contemplation of the law, a lewd woman
is much more likely to consent to such an
act than a chaste woman would be.
Hence,
evidence that the prosecutrix was generally
reputed to be unchaste is relevant for the
purpose just stated.
In recent years,

this Court has recognized the inherent

prejudice caused a complainant where evidence of her prior
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unchastity is introduced as well as the emliaras:;ment and ordeal
a complainant can be subjected to when such evidence is admi•te,
See State v. Johns, supra.

On the other hand,

this Court hac

recognized that a rape accusation generally evolves from a
situation involving only two people and is easy to charge but
difficult to defend.

State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281,1283

(Utah 1980); State v. Horne, 364 P.2d 109,112 (Utah 1961);
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 469 (Utah 1975).
In State v. Johns, supra,

this Court resolved the tension

between these two competing concerns by acknowledging that
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity may be
relevant where consent is at issue, but can only be admitted
where the probative value of such evidence outweighs the inherent
danger of unfair prejudice as well as the possibility of confusion
of issues, unwarranted invasion of privacy and needless presentation of issues.

See State v. Johns, supra.

In State v. Pope, 545 P.2d 946 (Arizona 1976), the Arizona
Supreme Court recognized that there are certain situations where
evidence of prior unchaste acts of the complainant has sufficient
probative value to outweigh the inflamatory effect and
require admission.

"These would include evidence.

which

directly refutes physical or scientific evidence, such as the
victim's alleged loss of virginity,
or pregnancy," State v.

the orgin of semen, diseas 0

Pope, supra at 255.

In this case, the probative value of evidence that complainant had sexual intercourse with someone other than appellant
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,; '), Ln fortv eight hours of the incident clearly outweighs the
· •11c·erns set forth in State v. Johns, supra.
The fact that complainant had intercourse with someone
11runediately prior to the intercourse with appellant would have
bolstered appellant's theory that complainant was pregnant,
or at least believed herself to be, and that complainant had
venereal disease and consented to intercourse, thereafter
accusing appellant of rape,

in an effort to shield herself.

The evidence indicates that complainant was pregnant at the
time of the incident, or at least

believed herself to be, since

she told both appellant and the police officer at the scene
that she was pregnant (See T.

70,146-147,208).

The evidence also suggests that complainant transferred
some form of venereal disease to appellant.

Appellant had not

had intercourse for over a month prior to the incidenct with
complainant; two weeks after the incident, while still confined
in the county jail, appellant contracted a form of venereal
disease which could have been sexually transmitted (see T.

212-214,200).

It was appellant's theory that complainant

desired to protect herself by accusing appellant and possibly
obtaining medication to abort the pregnancy and eliminate the
venereal disease.

Evidence that complainant had recent sex

another would have enhanced this theory.
In addition, the existence of sperm on the crotch of
1:omplainant' s underwear was introduced as physical evidence by

-9-

the proseuction to bolster its case,
linked to appellant, however, absent

The

Sflc>CTTJ

\vilS

not directl,

information thal comrlain•

had sex with another immediately µrior to the incident with
appellant, it is safe to assume that the jury made such a
connection and considered the location of the sperm as probative
to the proseuction's case.

Evidence that complainant had recent

sex with another would have caused the jury to question who
deposited the sperm.
would arise.

As the evidence stood, no such question

When such evidence is coupled with evidence that

complainant was angry with Charlena and believed Charlena to be
appellant's girlfriend,

the case showing complainant's motive to

consent and later to lie is strengthened.
Clearly, evidence that complainant had prior sex with another
is probative to the issue of consent since it shows complainant
had a reason to consent in order to shield herself and could
raise questions as to physical evidence introduced by prosecution
to show lack of consent.
The probative value of such evidence outweighs the concerns
set forth in State v. Johns, supra.
First, there would be no undue prejudice by admitting this
evidence.

Complainant had already made it clear to the jury

that she was not inexperienced when she explained to the Court
and jury that she did not like cunnilingus (T .19).

The implicc-

tion in such statement is, of course, that she is sexually
experienced and experienced enough to know her prefences.
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In

· i J1r of this,

she would not be prejudiced by introduction of

·[Jenee that she had previously had sexual intercourse since
,11c had alreadv made

the jury aware of that fact.

Second, there would not have been a confusion of the issues.
Appellant merely wanted to establish that the bruises and
semen could have been caused by another and that complainant
had a reason to consent and thereafter
Nor would there be

invasion of privacy or needless

presentation of evidence.
only one question.

implicate appellant.

Defense counsel endeavored to ask

No names were sought and, as previously

stated, complainant had already clarified to the jury that she
was sexually experienced.
In balance, it is clear that the probative value of such
evidence outweigh

the other considerations, and therefore,

should have been admitted.
The excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict, since evidence
of sexual intercourse immediately prior to the incident when
combined with evidence of complainant's pregnancy

and anger

at Charlena would have bolstered appellant's theory and
possibily caused the jury to return a different verdict.
J;ght of this,

the verdict should be overturned.

·if E•;iJence 5,

Utah Code Ann.

(as amended 1953).
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In

See Rules

B.

ADMISSIBLE AS TO CREDIBILlfY.

Although the issues of credibility of the compldinant in a
rape case and consent are somewhat overlapping,
clearly two separate questions.

they are

See dicta in State v. Smith,

62 P.2d 1110,1113 (Utah 1936).
While the law does not and should not recognize any
connection between veracity of a witness and her sexual promiscuit··
prior sexual acts can provide a motive to alter the truth when
testifying.

See State v. Scott, supra at 865; State v. Johns,

supra at 1264.
In State v. Scott, supra at 865, this court stated in dicta
that in a prosecution for rape where the defendant's theory
was that the complainant was pregnant by another and prosecuting
appellant to shield herself, it would be proper on
to establish that fact and to show complainant had intercourse
with a third person.

See also State v. Smith, supra at 1113.

Evidence that complainant had sex within forty eight hours
of the incident would have been probative as to credibility, not
because her veracity was linked to promiscuity, but because
she may have had a motive to lie, i.e.,

that she was pregnant

or had venereal disease, and desired to shield herself.

This

evidence, coupled with complainant's anger at Charlena whom
she believed to be appellant's girlfriend,
probative value.
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takes on even greater

Even where the balancing test set forth in State v. Johns,
is applied, this evidence, as previously outlined, out•.;eighs

concerns which might otherwise preclude its admission.

Thus , the evidence should have been admitted.
In this case, where complainant is the principal witness
against appellant, it is critical that appellant be permitted
to attack complainant's credibility.

Failure to admit evidence

of complainant's last sexual intercourse prior to the incident
severely hampered appellant and such evidence would probably
have had a substantial impact on the minds of the jury.
C.

THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT SUCH
EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
guarantees an accused the right to confront witnesses against
him.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees

a similar right.

The right to confront witnesses is more than

a mere right to face witnesses; it includes the right of a
defendant to cross-examine witnesses against him.
415 U.S.

308, 94 S.Ct. ll05, 39 L.ed.2d 347 (1974).

One aspect of

is the ability to expose a

witness' motive in testifying.
1386, 1388

Davis v.

(Utah 1977).

See State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d

See also Davis v. Alaska, supra.

While limiting cross-examination is within the discretion
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of the court, "(t)he court is particul:irl·
wide latitude in areas of

and mot1v<.

c·11·c·1·,.1_

t" allm-1

f,,, testif,,·i11,•,."

State v. Maestas, supra at 1258.
As previously outlined, evidence that complainant had
intercourse within forty eight hours of the incident was
relevant to the issues of consent and credibility of the
complainant, and such relevancy outweighed any concerns as to
undue prejudice, confusion of issues or needless presentation
of evidence.

Failure to admit such evidence inhibited

appellant's opportunity to establish complainant's motive to
testify falsely and to otherwise cross-examine complainant
and thereby violated appellant's right to confront witnesses
against him, thereby depriving him of due process of law.
POINT I I
THE STATES FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE IN
ITS POSSESSION DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
The duty of the prosecution to preserve evidence in its
possession has evolved

from the prosecution's duty to disclose

favorable evidence to an accused as set forth in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963).

In Brady v. Maryland,

held:
that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process of law where
the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution.

-14-

the U.S.S.(

'' i

"'

8 7.

The right to discovery set forth in Brady is applicable in
cl:c,·e

situations:

(1) where state's case contains perjured

:cstimony and such testimony could have affected the verdict,
regardless if whether a request for discovery was made;
the state fails

(2) where

to disclose evidence which was specifically

rPquested; and (3) where undisclosed evidence raises a reasonable
doubt as to guilt, regardless of whether such evidence was
requested.

See also Codianna v. Myers, 660 P. 2d 1101, 1106 (Utah,

1983); U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-113 (1976).
Courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the prosecution's
duty to disclose to include the duty to preserve evidence.

In

Gnited States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 643 (D.C.Cir. 1973), the Court
remanded the case where the state did not preserve a tape record(1) the

ing between defendant and narcotics agents to determine:
efforts by the state to preserve the tape;

(2) the importance of

che lost tape; and (3) the evidence of guilt at trial.
653.

Id. at

The court pointed out that the government bears a heavy

burden to explain

the loss, based on its duty to preserve

which might be favorable to the defendant.

Id. at 652.

See also State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976);
l'_Pnnle v. Morgan, 606 P.2cl 1296 (Colo. 1980).
Colorado applies a three prong test in determining whether
l•ctruction of evidence violates a defendant's due process rights:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Whether evidence was suppressed or destroyed
by prosecution;
Whether evidence was exculpatory;
Whether evidence was material to defendant's case.
-15-

State v. Morgan,
Since in destruction cases the evidence no longer exisrs
to

determine whether it is favorable to

courts

have relaxed the materiality standard and found a due process
violation where there was a "reasonable possibility that the
evidence destroyed by the police or at their direction was
material to guilt or innocence and favorable to appellant,"
State v. Wright, supra at 6.
This Court has not dealt directly with the prosecution's
duty to preserve evidence.

In State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477,

(Utah 1975), this Court acknowledged that the deliberate
suppression or destruction of evidence violates due process
if such evidence was material.

However, in the context of

prosecutorial duty to disclose, this Court has acknowledged
that good faith is irrelevant where evidence favorable to the
accused is suppressed and a specific request for such evidence
has been made.

See State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980).

The Jarrell court stated:
The overriding concern in cases involving
prosecutorial nondisclosure of evidence
which tends to exculpate the defendant is
the defendant's right to a fair trial in
a criminal trial it is essential that evidence which tends to exonerate the defendant
be aired as fullv as that which tends to
exonerate him.
Id. at 225.
This focus on fairness to the defendant rather tha"l prosecutorial misconduct is found throughout the cases dealing with the
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ro

disclose as well as the dutv to preserve and should be

,:, 1•! iPd in the present situation in determining whether failure
LO

'"serve the knife violated appellant's due process right.
ln line with decisions in regard to the prosecution's

Jut; to disclose and preserve evidence, appellant urges this

Court to consider:

(1) the role of the prosecution in regard to

the failure to preserve the evidence; and (2) whether there was
a reasonable possibility the evidence was material; and (3)
whether the evidence was exculpatory.
In this case, the State failed to preserve the pocketknife
aopellant allegedly used to threaten complainant.

The pocket-

knife had a single small dull blade (T.

Appellant

203,204).

used it as a screwdriver and to clean his nails (T. 203).
Complainant was unintimidated enough by the knife that she
returned it to appellant when she found it in the bed, and thereafter paid no attention to its location (T. 56,69,210).
Clearly,

the prosecution had custody and control over the

knife from the moment it was taken from appellant at the scene.
The prosecution brought it as evidence to the preliminary hearing
IT. 191).

The loss can only be attributed to the prosecution,

and good or bad faith of the prosectuion is irrelevant.
The knife is clearly material to the case since the charge
of

sexual assault, rather than rape, stems from use

')[ the knife, and much of complainant's testimony revolved around
?nc:cetknife.
There is a reasonable possibility that admission of the pocket-17-

knife would have tended to exculrate '-'P!'cd l .int
testimony as to the knife shmveJ i r tu lie
like a screwdriver or nail file than a knife.

.\ll of the
1, du] 1 .rnJ more
Admission of a

small dull pocketknife could have created a less threatening,
less frightening impression on the jury and

when coupled with

the inconsistencies in complainant's story and the other evidenti·
ary problems set forth infra,

it is likely that admission of

such evidence would have had a significant impact on the jury.
Thus, the prosecution's failure to preserve the knife as
evidence but nevertheless introduce testimony in regard to it
violated appellant's due process rights and right to a fair
trial, and caused prejudicial error,

thereby requiring that the

verdict be overturned.

POINT III
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
A.

THE COMPLAINANT'S STORY IS SUFFICIENTLY
INCONCLUSIVE OR
IMPROBABLE.

While the issues of whether a complainant consented or
succumbed against her will are generally questions for the jury,
a conviction must be

overturned for lack of sufficient evidence

where the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherenth
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
able doubt that the appellant committed the crime of which he
was convicted," State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (l.:tah 1983)
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State v. Kerekes,
Jl"J ?tate v.

Lamm,

622 P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah 1980).

See

606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); State v.

364 P. 2d 109 (Utah 1961).
In a case where the charge is rape, the evidence must be
carefully scrutinized to avoid unmerited conviction-

State v.

Stettina, 635 P.2d 74,77 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Herzog,

SlO P 2d 1281,1283 (Utah 1980), State v. Horne, supra.

The ease

of the assertion of the charge and the difficulty of proving
the defense other than by the appellant's denial should be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence.
v. Horne,

State

635 P.2d 109 (Utah 1961); State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281,

1283 (Utah 1980).

The intent of such scrutiny is "the protection

of one who engages in intimate relations with another under the
impression that all is proceeding by mutual consent, only to be
faced later by a claim

of rape," State v. Herzog, supra at 1283.

A careful consideration of the evidence in this case, in
light of the case of the assertion and the difficulty of defense
of the charge establishes that complainant's story is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable so that reasonable minds
would not find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed
the offense.

The fabric of evidence against the appellant must

cover the gap betwen the presumption of innocence and proof of
z;uilt in order to sustain the conviction.

ru

State v. Petree, supra.

this case, even stretching the evidence to its limit, it fails

ro bridge that gap.
-19-

First, much of complainant's clairn that appellant rhre>.1L.:··
her with serious bodily injur1 revolves around tile pocketkn1rc
As previously outlined,

the only description of the blade of

knife is that it was a small, dull blade which was not in good
working order to cut things, but functioned as a tool or screwdriver or for cleaning nails

(T.

204).

Appellant had used the

knife earlier in the evening to clean his nails so complainant
should have been aware he had a pocketknife in his possession
(T. 203-204).

The pocketknife ended up loose in the bed, complaG

ant returned it to appellant (T.

56, 210).

After that, complainant

did not pay attention to where the knife was

(T. 69-70).

The description of the pocketknife coupled with the fact
that complainant returned it to appellant then paid no attention
to where it was shows that complainant was not frightened by
the knife.

In addition, as previously discussed,

the prosecutorial duty to preserve evidence,
placed into evidence.

in spite of

the knife was not

Thus, this inconclusive testimony is the

only evidence introduced in regard to the knife.
Complainant described scenes at both the front door and in
the bedroom.

She testified that appellant held a knife to her

throat and cheek, but no knife marks were found on her and her
clothing was not cut.

Complainant also testified that appellant

threw her against the floor, walls and headboard, but her arms,
legs, back, head and torso were not bruised (T.
Absent any bruising, complainants tale
is inherently improbable.
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62,95-100).

of physical ·1iolence

As will be discussed later in more detail, complainant made
'" ,.,·al inconsistent statements at trial.

Prior to trial, she

stated that the knife did not come out until she was in the

bedroom (T.

145-146).

At trial, she testified for the first

time in great detail that she was threatened with the knife at
the open front door (T.

51-54).

This major inconsistency in

her tale makes the story inconclusive.
Complainant had several opportunities to escape or cry out
for help.

Her failure to do so when such opportunities presented

themselves adds to the improbability of her version.

According

to complainant, the front door was open when appellant initially
pulled the knife (T. 51).

There were apartments on either side

and numerous over-crowded apartments across the street but
complainant did not cry out nor did she try to escape (T. 121-22,
86-87).

Later, appellant helped complainant telephone her "father"

(T. 68-69).
(T.

71).

arrive (T.

Appellant fell asleep, fully clothed on the bed

It took about half an hour for complainant's friend to

26).

During that time, appellant slept and complainant

moved around the living room and kitchen, but did not try to
leave (T.

72,74-78,86-87).

When complainant's friend arrived,

she showed him a note

c!lro11gh the window, but again did not attempt to leave even
thuugh appellant was asleep (T. 27,78-79,112).

She chose to

more than five additional minutes with appellant even though
knew her friend was waiting outside (T. 133).
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This failure

to cry out or leave when presented with an

h:•·•;•11te opportunit

to do so enhances the improbabilitv of complainant's srorv.
Finally, appellant's actions make complainant's storv
inconclusive.

Appellant allegedly threatened and raped her,

then helped her find a phone number to call "her father" (T. 21-:

68-69).

Appellant slept peacefully while complainant moved

around the apartment and up until the time the officers placed
the handcuffs on him (T.

71-73,76,140).

This hardly suggests

that appellant had just corrnnitted the crime charged.
In all, the evidence showing that appellant threatened
complainant and that complainant did not consent to the act is
sufficently inconclusive that reasonable minds could not find
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant corrnnitted the crime and
therefore the conviction should be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW ON
"CONSENT" AND "AGAINST THE WILL" IN A
RAPE CASE.

Defense counsel proposed the following instructions:
An act of sodomy or sexual intercourse is
without. the consent of the vie t im when the actor
compels the victim to submit or participate by
force that overcomes such earnest resistance
that her age, strength of body and mind make it
reasonable for her to do under the circumstances;
or by any threat that would prevent resistance
by a person of ordinary resolution.
Such force
or threats need not be limited to physical violence but may also include psychological and
emotional stress or a combination of all three.
Furthermore, it is not necessary to show that
the victim engaged in heroics or subjected herself to great brutality or suffered or risked
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serious wounds or injuries.
The law recognizes a number of factors which
should be considered to determine if a sexual
act was performed with or without the consent
of one of the parties.
One factor is evidence
of marks or bruising on either party reflecting
actual physical violence. Another factor is the
opportunity to escape or whether the victim made
an outcry.
These can be reflected in the time of
day of the incident, the isolated location of the
incident, the possible sources of assistance in
the sexual activity to the victim and any active
participation by the victim.
Likewise, the ease
of assertion of the forcible accomplishment of
the sexual act with the attendant difficulties
of defending against such an assertion, and the
proneness of the victim to assert force or violence
when she realizes that her activities are likely
to be discovered may also be considered.
These
factors and any which you may find in the evidence
or lack thereof, can be considered by you in
determining whether or not the victim consented
to the sexual acts alleged to have occurred.
Appellant also requested that the following instruction be
given:
The essential element in rape is the forcing
of intercourse upon a woman "without her consent"
and "against her will." These terms do not mean
the same thing because such an act might occur
in circumstances which would be "without her
consent" but which would not necessarily involve
overcoming her will and her resistance, both of
which must be proved.
If one of these elements
has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant not guilty of
rape.
The court refused to give these instructions, and instead
gave the following instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
You are instructed that sexual intercourse
occurs "without consent" under any one of the
following situations:
1.
When the actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by force that overcomes
such earnest resistance as might reasonably
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be expected under the circumsta_!'_C_('._S, nr
2.
The actor compels the victim to suhmit
or participate by anv threat that would
prevent resistance bv a person of ordinarv
resolution. [Emphasis added.]
INSTRUCTION NO.

14

In determining whether the victim's will and
resistance were overcome, it is appropriate to
consider that this may be accomplished by either
physical force and violence or by psychological
or emtional stress imposed upon her, or by a
combination of them.
As to the degree of
resistance required: The victim need do no more
than her age and her strength of body and mind
make it reasonable for her to do under the
circumstances to resist.
It is not necessary
that it be shown that she engaged in any
heriocs or that she otherwise risked the
assailant's brutality or infliction of serious
wounds or injuries.
[Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel made a timely objection to the Court's
refusal to give instructions as requested.
It is well settled that a party is entitled to have his
theory of the case submitted to the jury, and it is prejudicial
error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon where there
is evidence to support such theory.

Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d

455 (Utah 1981); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977);
Elington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980).
The purpose of instructions to the jury is to inform them
as to the applicable law and enable them to resolve the issues.
Elkington v. Faust, supra at 40.
Where a trial is by jury, the court may not comment on
the quality or credibility of the evidence.

This means the

court may not indicate it favors the position of either the
-24-

. 1.;,1- l l::rnt or the state.
1. - '1,

:;rate v.

l'l1e
che

State v.

Schoenfeld,

Sanders, 496 P.2d 270,275 (Utah

545 P. 2d 193, 197 (Utah 1976).

instruction as to consent proposed by appellant outlines

applicable law.

The first sentence echoes Utah Code Ann.

; 76-5-406 (1953 as amended) which states in pertinent part:
7 6- 5-406.
Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or
sexual abuse without consent of victim-Circumstances. --An act of sexual intercourse,
sodomy, or sexual abuse is without consent of
the victim under any of the following circumstances:
(1) When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might
reasonably be expected under the circumstances;
or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to submit
or participate by any threat that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution;
or .
The second and third sentences of the proposed instruction state
that force or threats need not be limited to physical violence but
ma? also include psychological stress, and that the victim need

not show that she engaged in heroics.
in State v.

This language is found

Studham, 572 P.2d 200 (Utah 1977).

Thus, the first

?aragraph makes it clear that physical violence is not necessary
co show a woman did not consent.

The second paragraph of the proposed instruction balances
against the concerns of the first paragraph, and sets forth
1

1ctors which may be considered to show whether the act was with

consent.

The second sentence would have informed the jury that

brqising or other physical evidence may be taken into account.
-25-

See State v. Horne, 365 P.2d lO'J (1Jt3h l'J(d).

Escape, outcrv.

source of assistance may also be considered in determining
whether a woman consented.

State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1231

(Utah 1980).
The Court chose to instruct the jury that the woman's
will could be overcome by psychological stress rather than
just physical force,

that a victim must only act reasonably

and need not engage in heroics.

While these statements are

found in case law, it is important that the jury be instructed
as to factors it can take into account in determining whether a
woman consented.

As the instruction stands, it serves as an

improper comment on the evidence.

It essentially tells the

jury the woman, referred to throughout as "victim" (which creates
initial prejudice) need not be forced physcially or act in any
specific manner or engage in heroics.

Had the Court instructed

the jury as requested, the jury would have been informed as to
factors it could consider and not directed in their decision
making process by weighted instructions suggesting that the
complainant had acted properly.
The Court also refused to make it clear to the jury that
forcing intercourse upon a woman "without her consent" or "agains:
her will" are two distinct concepts.

This distinction is set

forth in State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977).
Instructions to the jury as to the factors it could considec
in determining whether the complainant consented and clarifying
-26-

, ' 1r
,,,,1.j

".1c;ainst the wi 11" is a different concept than consent
rirobabl? ha'Je had a substantial impact on the jury's

deci.,ion.
As previously outlined, the complainant's story was inherently
improbable and inconclusive.

Had the jury not been given an

instruction weighted in favor of the complainant, it is likely
that the verdict would have been different.

Therefore,

it

was reversible error for the court to instruct the jury in the
manner set forth above.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS HADE
BY A WITNESS.
Defense counsel requested that the following instruction be
given to the jury:
You are instructed that if a witness has
made statements prior to the trial which are
inconsistent with the testimony at trial, and
that at the time of his prior statements he
had adequate opportunity to perceive the event
or condition his prior statements narrates,
explains, or describes, you may consider such
prior statements to be substantive evidence
in this case of the truth of those prior statements and that the declarant of such statements
has spoken falsely either at the trial or on
that prior occasion.
The Court refused, ctnd defense counsel made a timely objection
to such refusal.
\fuile the credibility of witnesses is generally a question
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for the jury, the Court must instrurt lhc
law.

Elkington v. Faust, supr§c

254 (Colo. 1982).

In addition,

theory presented to the jury.

ilt

c'.+IJ,

juc

as to the applin:

State v. Miltters,

f'

a p.fftv is entitled to have hi.
\Jatters v. Querrv, supra, State __-

Maestas, supra.
Evidence Code Rule 63 (Utah Code Ann.

1953 as amended),

applicable at the time of trial in this matter states in pertinen:
part:
Hearsay Evidence Excluded - Exceptions
Evidence of a statement which is made other than
by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
(1)
Prior statements of witnesses.
A prior
statement of a witness, if the judge finds that
the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive the event or condition which his statement
narrates, describes or explains, provided that
(a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony,
or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts
which the witness denies having stated or has
forgotten since making the statement, or (c)
it will support testimony made by the witness
in the present case when such testimony has
been challenged.
Thus, prior inconsistent statements by a witness are admissib:,
for purposes of impeachment and as substantive evidence of the
truth of the matters stated.

The instruction offered by defense

counsel restates this rule of law.
The evidence shows that complainant, the principal and
virtually sole witness against appellant, made several statcment 0
at reial which were not consistent with statements hild made
earlier.

At the outset of her testimony, complainant stated til.i:

she had readily admitted appellant into her apartment 1vhen he
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returned to use the phone (T.11).
'l1r·

However,

immediately after

incident she told police officers that she had not wanted

'"let him in (T.

145-146).

Complainant testified in depth as to the knife being drawn
at the door and the way in which appellant held the knife to her
throat while still at the door, whereas she had previously
told the police that the knife was not drawn until after she
and appellant were in the bedroom and she was on the bed (T.
14,50-54,145-146).
At trial, complainant testified that appellant threw her
against the bed,

floor, walls and headboard (T.18).

She had

not mentioned being thrown against the walls to police immediately
after the incident (T. 146) or to the rape crisis volunteer who
spoke with her immediately after the incident (T. 175).
Complainant implied by her testimony at trial that she was
not pregnant on the night of the incident, but on the night in
question she told both the officers and appellant that she was
pregnant (T.

70,84,146-147,208).

Clearly, complainant made numerous statements at trial which
were inconsistent with statements she had made to officers and
others.

Her credibility was of major importance since the

evidence essentially consisted of her testimony against that of
appellant.
In such a situation, it was imperative that the jury be
instructed as to how to deal with such inconsistent statements
end that such statements could be considered as substantive
evidence in addition to raising questions about the credibility
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of the complainant.

Had the jury been in,;tri1c1 ,,d in this manner

it is probable that thev would have

the evidence

differently and found that the evidence did not show bevond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guiltv of aggravated sexual
assault.
The fact that complainant was pregnant, or believed herself
to be pregnant on the night of the incident, was critical to
appellant's theory that complainant agreed to have sexual
intercourse with him and subsequently accused him of aggravated
sexual assault to shield herself.
appellant's case that the

Thus, it was critical to

jury understand that complainant's

statements to officers and appellant that she was pregnant
could be considered substantively for the truth of the matter
stated.
Complainant's lengthy description of the knife scene at
the front door was damaging to appellant; it was critical that
the jury not only understand that she had previously made
statements which were substantially different, but also that
this statement and other inconsistencies should be looked at
to determine the overall credibility of the witness.
Similarly, the story at trial as to how appellant threw
her against walls and floors should have been evaluated in
light of her overall credibility.

Her changing story as to

whether she voluntarily admitted appellant into her apartment
raised additional questions as to her credibility, and the
jury needed zuidance as to how to evaluate her testimony.
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In all cases where a witness makes inconsistent statements,
1,,,

,11r·r

,1c<>r1·,

should he instructed as to how it can evaluate such

istencies,

Howc'1er, in a rape case where the complainant

is essentiallv the sole witness against a defendant and some of
Lhc inconsistences,

if looked at for substantive purposes,

support the appellant's theory, it is essential that the jury
be instructed as requested by defense counsel in order to
adequately evaluate the evidence.
The trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to how
to view inconsistent statements by a witness amounted to
reversible error and the verdict should therefore be overturned.
CONCLUSION
Evidence that complainant had sexual intercourse within
forty eight hours of the incident should have been admitted.
Such evidence was relevant to the issues of consent and credii,i li ty of the complainant,

and did not present any other over-

riding concerns which would have precluded such admission.

Had

such evidence been admitted, it is likely that the jury would
h3ve reached a different verdict.

In addition, failure to admit

such evidence violated appellant's constitutional rights to
confront witnesses against him.
The right to due process of law is guaranteed by the
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
1·t'cle I,

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

The appellant's

;noccss right was violated when the State failed to preserve
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--the pocketknife which appellant alledcedly used to threaten
complainant.
There was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictirllJ
In a rape case, the evidence must be carefully scrutinized to
avoid unmerited conviction.
such scrutiny.

The State's case does not survive

Complainant's story was inherently improbable

and inconclusive.

In addition,

the jury was not properly

instructed on the law of consent.
Finally, the trial court failed to properly instruct the
jury as to the law regarding inconsistent statements by a
witness.

In this case, complainant's credibility was an

essential issue since she was the principal witness.

In addition,

the jury should have been made aware that her prior statements
could be considered substantively.

Failure to do so, where,

as here, prior statements supported appellant's case, is
reversible error.
While each of these errors, standing alone, was significant
enough to require reversal, the cumulative effect of such
errors magnifies the unfairness at trial and is sufficient
to mandate reversal of the conviction or a remand for a new
trial.
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all of the reasons
to be presented at oral argument,

if any, appellant respectfull::

requests that the conviction in this case be reversed or, in
the alternative,

the matter be remanded for new trial.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1984.

'

JOAN C. WATT

j

( .j

DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
co the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ...2L___ day of April, 1984.
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